114 Part 1 / Basic Economic Systems
Threat to Capitalism
Finally, if government becomes involved in the determination of labor contract terms in order to avoid strikes, it may not be able to stop there. With our democratic political structure it would be impossible, I believe, to prevent compulsory settlement of wages for union members from leading to compulsory determination of alt wages; that, in turn, would lead to government decisions concerning salaries, professional fees, and, finally, prices and profits.
So long as free collective bargaining is permitted, It forms an. outer perimeter of defense against government regulation in other areas. If it falls, the possibility of more regulation in the other areas becomes much greater, 11 is worth noting that George Meany. the president of the AFL-CIO, stated several months ago that he would not be opposed to wage controls it similar controls were placed on salaries, prices, and profits. Meany's view of these relationships is one that many people might share.
CONCLUSION
How do the costs of the right to strike compare with the costs of the alternative, compulsory settlement? Taking strike costs first, my analysis indicates that:
It is easy to overemphasize the costs of strikes.
Much progress has already been made in replacing organizational strikes, jurisdictional strikes, and grievance strikes with peaceful alternatives.
Strikes—even the big industrywide ones—have a minimal effect on the economy,
Some strikes, such as those in public utilities, which once were very critical, are no longer so because of automation.
The number of man-days lost because of strikes is a very small par! of the total (only 0.23 percent in 1969). and the trend has been definitely downward.
On the other hand, my analysis indicates that compulsory settlement involves major costs like these:
The elimination from collective bargaining of the strongest incentive to reach agreement which management and labor now have.
A great increase in the number of failures to reach agreement.
The development of a large government bureaucracy to adjudicate the larger number of unsettled disputes.
An increase in political aspects of collective bargaining.
The difficulty of enforcement of compulsory orders, with the attendant danger of divulging She impotence of government.
The likely development of other wage, safary, price. and profit controls by government.
I conclude that the right to strike is preferable to a compulsory settlement system. It does not follow (hat the government should never move to protect the public against strikes which create serious hardships, but It does follow that any move to prohibit the use of the strike in the private sector should be made cautiously and only to the extent which is clearly required. Any broad prohibition of strike freedom would prove to be very costly in itself and also lead to major government controls over other parts of the economy. Free collective bargaining, which includes the right to strike and the right to lockout, constitutes the outer defense of the private enterprise system.
UNION EFFECTS ON WAGES-A CAUTION
In 96 percent or more of labor negotiations, as Kennedy points out above, the result is not a strike but a new contract. One of the most important objectives of labor in the setting of this new contract will be to raise the level of wages. Let us briefly indicate how a union can cause a departure from the market-determined wage and then suggest why caution must be used In interpreting this piece of analysis.